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Public health practiceResponding rapidly and appropriately to a covert anthrax release is an important public health challenge. A
methodology to assist the geographical targeting of such a response has recently been published; as have a number
of independent studies that investigatemitigation strategies. Here,we reviewand combine someof these published
techniques tomore realistically assess howkey aspects of the public health responsemight impact on the outcomes
of a bioterrorist attack.We combine awithin-hostmathematicalmodelwith our spatial back-calculationmethod to
investigate the effects of a number of important response variables. These include howpreviously reported levels of
adherence with taking antibiotics might affect the total outbreak size compared to assuming full adherence. Post-
exposure vaccination is also considered, bothwith andwithout theuseof antibiotics. Further,we investigate a range
of delays (2, 4 and 8 days) before interventions are implemented, following the last day of symptomatic onset of
some number of observed initial cases (5, 10 and 15). Our analysis conﬁrms that outbreak size is minimised by
implementing prophylactic treatment after having estimated the exposed area based on5observed cases; however,
imperfect (rather than full) adherence with antibiotics results in approximately 15% additional cases. Moreover, of
those infected individualswho only partially adherewith a prophylactic course of antibiotics, 86% remain disease
free; a result that holds for scenarios in which infected individuals inhale much higher doses than considered
here. Increasing logistical delays have a particularly detrimental effect on lives saved with an optimal strategy of
early identiﬁcation and analysis. Our analysis shows that it is critical to have systems and processes in place to
rapidly identify, geospatially analyse and then swiftly respond to a deliberate anthrax release.), j.legrand@imperial.ac.uk
z@imperial.ac.uk
uson), steve.leach@hpa.org.uk
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In the event of a covert aerosolised anthrax release in the UK, public
health authorities would attempt to provide antibiotics to exposed
individuals in order to minimise the number of casualties and deaths
(HPA website, 2010). Our recent spatial back-calculation study (Legrand
et al., 2009) has shown that it might be possible to identify those
individuals sufﬁciently exposed to warrant prophylactic treatment using
data on the ﬁrst few cases (symptomatic onset dates and home/work
locations) along with recent meteorological conditions. To estimate the
potential beneﬁt of using this method, we previously assumed that
prophylactic antibiotic treatment would be administered to exposed
individuals after a ﬁxed logistical delay (4 days) following symptomatic
onset of somenumber (5 to 15) of observed initial cases, such asmight be
required to prompt recognition of a covert attack and also to permit the
statistical analysis of the geographical extent of the release. We alsoassumed that antibiotics would completely prevent disease in all those
who were symptom-free at the time of antibiotic administration. As we
highlighted previously, some of these assumptions are uncertain and
require sensitivity analysis — indeed, a number of research papers
(Brookmeyer et al., 2004;Weinet al., 2003;Wein andCraft, 2005; Baccam
and Boechler, 2007; Fowler et al., 2005; Craft et al., 2005; Braithwaite et
al., 2006; Zaric et al., 2008; Wilkening, 2008) have considered such
outcomes but only from a contingency planning perspective rather than
one of a real-time response situation, which we consider here. In this
study, we brieﬂy review the substantial amount of modelling work that
has been performed regarding anthrax mitigation strategies. We then
combine aspects of these modelling approaches with our own work on
spatial back-calculation approaches to evaluate more realistic treatment
outcomes. In addition to examining antibiotic prophylaxis, the possibility
of implementing prophylactic vaccination is also assessed.
Background
Brookmeyer et al. (2004) developed a mechanistic within-host
model describing the human dose–response relationship of anthrax
based on germination and clearance rates of bacillus anthracis spores
inhaled into the lungs. This model was used to analyse the beneﬁts of
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administration and patient adherence levels following an aerosolised
anthrax release. It was found that “even if mass distribution of
antibiotics is completed within six days of the initial exposure, then at
most about 70% of cases can be prevented”. Post-exposure vaccination
was shown to have limited preventative effects due to the delay of
approximately one month after vaccination before achieving immu-
nity. However, other factors such as antibiotic resistant strains or low
adherencewith long-termantibiotic therapymean that post-exposure
vaccination could prove to be an important secondary intervention. It
was also shown that any additional beneﬁts gained frompre-exposure
vaccination would require very high population coverage.
Wein et al. (2003) assessed the impact of a large scale anthrax attack
on a typical U.S. city and similarly highlighted the need for rapid
antibiotic distribution to exposed individuals, especially as hospitalisa-
tion proved to be a bottle-neck in the healthcare system. Their model
was further developed to assess the relative beneﬁts of administering a
vaccine prior to or after an anthrax attack (Wein and Craft, 2005). This
latter paper, however, has a slight error whereby an equation describing
exposed individuals was applied to infected individuals (see Eq. (A4) in
the Appendix). Fortunately, this only has a relatively small effect on the
quantitative results and does not change the qualitative conclusion that,
with orwithout pre-exposure vaccination, a post-exposure strategy that
combinedboth antibiotics andanthraxvaccinewas superior to antibiotic
prophylaxis alone. A recent simulation study undertaken by Baccam and
Boechler (2007) found complementary results to those presented in the
analytical study of Wein and Craft (2005) favouring a post-exposure
response with combined antibiotic and vaccine treatment.
A cost-effectiveness study by Fowler et al. (2005) similarly found
that “use of vaccine plus antibiotic prophylaxis is themost effective and
least expensive therapy” when considering post-attack strategies only.
This was because the additional vaccine related cost was shown to be
less than the high cost of hospital care for those individuals who would
otherwise become symptomatic due to the assumed imperfect
antibiotic efﬁcacy. Fowler et al. also suggested that pre-exposure
vaccination may become cost-effective if antibiotic distribution or
adherence was substantially impaired but interestingly found that
“antibiotic prophylaxis would still be a cost-effective component of
post-attack therapy, even for those who had previously received
vaccination” due to a less than 100% effective vaccine. Conversely,
Braithwaite et al. (2006) found that pre-event vaccinationwas less cost-
effective than post-event strategies primarily because of the assumed
low rates of adherence with anthrax immunization programmes.
Interestingly, Craft et al. (2005) only considered pre-event
vaccination and not post-event vaccination “because of the non-
negligible probability of another anthrax event, and because of the
great cost and difﬁculty of mounting an effective post-event response”
(Wein and Craft, 2005). Although the anthrax vaccine appears safer
than the smallpox vaccine, moderate and severe side effects would
likely occur with a large scale vaccination programme. The resistance
to smallpox and anthrax vaccination among front-line workers and
the military, respectively, suggests that it would be difﬁcult to achieve
the high levels of coverage required for pre-event vaccination to be
effective (Wein and Craft, 2005). Note that we do not consider pre-
event mass vaccination in the following analysis since we believe that
the associated problems outweigh any potential beneﬁts.
The mass treatment strategies considered in the above studies
essentially follow an assumption that “the true exposed population
soon after the event is unknown” (Baccam and Boechler, 2007).
Moreover, 3 further modelling papers (Braithwaite et al., 2006; Zaric
et al., 2008; Hupert et al., 2009) addressing the relative logistical and
operational merits of anthrax bioterrorism surveillance and response
have all highlighted the importance of identifying exposed individuals
once an attack has been detected. Our recent work (Legrand et al.,
2009) has shown that it may indeed be possible to satisfactorily
estimate the location and geographic extent of an anthrax attackbased on spatial and temporal information from early cases and recent
meteorological data. This was based on a method that combined a
spore dispersion model, within-host dynamics and daily movement
data. In the work presented below we use this previously developed
method to investigate a wider and more realistic range of mitigation
strategies and assumptions than considered previously.
Methods
Our previous model of an anthrax outbreak (Legrand et al., 2009)
incorporates the within-host dynamics of spore germination and
clearance (ﬁrst described by Brookmeyer et al. (2004)) in order to
calculate the probability of infection given a particular inhaled dose.
Both prophylactic antibiotics and vaccination can reduce this
probability of infection by destroying spores as they start to germinate
and multiply, thus preventing the production of disease inducing
toxins. Here we adapt previously published methodologies (Brook-
okmeyer et al., 2004; Wein and Craft, 2005) to compare the impact of
antibiotics and/or vaccination in the context of having estimated
those individuals requiring prophylactic treatment via our back-
calculation method (Legrand et al., 2009). To compute the outbreak
size for each mitigation strategy we applied the treatment effective-
ness (detailed in the Appendix) to infected individuals who had been
identiﬁed for treatment but whowere yet to develop symptoms at the
time of treatment administration. In the text that follows we describe
the parameterisation of these various mitigation strategies.
Treatment strategies
Previously we considered that all individuals identiﬁed as having
an exposure risk of at least 1/100,000 (via our spatial back-calculation
methodology) would receive antibiotics following a 4 day logistical
delay after the ﬁrst 5, 10, or 15 cases had occurred (Legrand et al.,
2009). AlthoughWein et al. (2003) similarly believed that “antibiotics
can be distributed to the entire population in 4 days” it was important
to investigate how uncertainties in this delay between outbreak
detection and prophylactic treatment would impact upon the total
number of cases; therefore, we considered delays of 2, 4 and 8 days.
Calculation of the outbreak size in our earlier study was based on
the simplifying assumption that adherence with, and efﬁcacy of,
antibiotic prophylaxis for 60 days was 100% if initiated prior to the
onset of symptoms (termed full antibiotic adherence). However,
experience from the 2001 anthrax attacks suggests that many
individuals will only partially adhere with a prophylactic course of
antibiotics (Shepard et al., 2002). To account for this behavioural
effect we followed Wein and Craft (2005) so that among individuals
offered antibiotics, 10% take no antibiotics, 15% take antibiotics for
exactly 15 days, 25% take them for exactly 30 days, 25% take them for
45 days, and 25% take them for the full 60 days. Hereafter this
behaviour is collectively referred to as imperfect antibiotic adherence.
In addition to prophylactic treatment based purely on antibiotics,
we also considered the impact of post-exposure prophylactic
vaccination (termed vaccination). The vaccine efﬁcacy was assumed
to be 90%, with 50% of those receiving the vaccine acquiring immunity
after 21 days and the other 50% after 28 days (Wein and Craft, 2005).
Five post-exposure treatment outcomes were therefore investigated:
1) No treatment;
2) Vaccination;
3) Imperfect antibiotic adherence;
4) Vaccination+imperfect antibiotic adherence; and
5) Full antibiotic adherence.
Whilst outcomes 1 and 5 had been compared in our earlier study
(Legrand et al., 2009) and outcomes 2–4 had been considered in some
earliermodelling studies elsewhere (Brookmeyer et al., 2004;Wein and
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a modelling context that included a realistic prospect of being able to
statistically estimate the population requiring prophylactic treatment.
Scenarios
We examined the impact of the treatment strategies under the
Reference scenario used in our previous work and the 5 mis-
speciﬁcation scenarios that account for the potential effects of
uncertainties in parameter values, data and model structure. Here
we provide a brief description of these scenarios; see Legrand et al.
(2009) for further details. For the Reference scenario, 40 anthrax
outbreaks were simulated following airborne releases of 1010 spores
from a height of 100 m into a 5 m/s westerly wind. In these
simulations the incubation period of infected individuals was based
on a continuous exposure model but the subsequent back-calculation
assumed an instantaneous exposure for the sake of simplicity.
Scenario A used the Reference scenario simulations but performed
the back-calculation with individuals' symptomatic onset times
rounded to the nearest half-day rather than the nearest hour. Scenario
B also used the Reference scenario simulations but with a median
delay between spore germination and symptomatic onset of 5 days in
the back-calculation model rather than the 2 days used to simulate
the outbreak. For each of scenarios C to E, we simulated 40 outbreaks
as before but with three modiﬁed versions of the simulation model;
the within-host dynamics component was replaced by the
model proposed by Brookmeyer et al. (2005) for a low dose exposure
(scenario C), the puff model of airborne dispersion was replaced by
the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (Sykes et al., 2007)
model (scenario D), and occasional movements were added to the
daily commuting data (scenario E). For each of these three scenarios
parameter inferences were performed with the Reference scenario
back-calculation model.
Results
Fig. 1 shows the extent to which imperfect antibiotic adherence
would result in slightly larger outbreaks (coloured box-plots) than inFig. 1. Impact of administeringprophylactic antibiotics to individuals livingorworking in a
ward exposed to a risk of at least 1/100,000 inhabitants with Reference scenario (Ref) and
scenarios A to E: outbreak size with no treatment (grey boxes), with imperfect antibiotic
adherence (coloured boxes) and with full antibiotic adherence (yellow boxes)
administered 4 days after the ﬁrst 5, 10 or 15 cases occurred. Each box-plot represents
the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of the total number of cases from 40
simulations (whiskers extend to 1.5 times the inter-quartile range).the case of assuming full adherence (yellow box-plots) (Legrand
et al., 2009). Although imperfect antibiotic adherence is perhaps
realistic given differences in human behaviour, the relatively small
differences in the number of cases highlight that our previous
assumption of complete antibiotic protection is reasonably accurate
for the small outbreaks considered here. More importantly however,
Fig. 2 shows how imperfect, as opposed to full, antibiotic adherence
has a larger effect on outbreak size when antibiotic prophylaxis is
initiated after a small number of cases have occurred; on average
approximately 15% more cases are expected when antibiotics are
implemented after 5 observed cases whereas only ~5% more cases
result when intervening after 15 observed cases. This occurs because
starting interventions earlier in an outbreak means that more
individuals are able to receive prophylactic treatment and therefore
more individuals can fail to adhere with the full course of antibiotics.
Thus, although our results conﬁrm that implementing interventions
based on fewer cases is still likely to prevent more cases than
awaiting further cases (Fig. 1), the effect of imperfect adherence is to
lessen this relative beneﬁt (Fig. 2).
Given that the delay from vaccination to acquisition of functional
immunity corresponds to a high percentile of the incubation period
distribution, a strategy based purely on post-exposure vaccination
of affected areas is likely to be only marginally better than providing
no treatment at all (Fig. 3). Although it is highly likely that public
health authorities would provide antibiotic treatment following an
aerosolised anthrax release, it is, however, possible that the anthrax
strain could be resistant to antibiotics and thus vaccination alone
might represent a ‘worst-case’ outcome under these circumstances.
With no antibiotic resistance, a combined antibiotic and vaccination
strategy is realistically optimal (Fig. 3), given that it is likely there
will be imperfect antibiotic adherence. However, as shown in Figs. 1
and 2 and supported in Fig. 3, if logistical constraints meant that
vaccination could not be performed then rapid administration of
antibiotics alone would still be a highly effective prophylactic
treatment strategy.
Treatment delays have far more of an effect if interventions are
initiated after 5 observed cases than after 15 observed cases (Fig. 3).
This is because with a ﬁnal expected outbreak size of about 25–30Fig. 2. Relative difference in outbreak size between outcomes of imperfect antibiotic
adherence and full antibiotic adherence. Antibiotics administered 4 days after the ﬁrst 5
(blue boxes), 10 (red boxes) or 15 (green boxes) cases have occurred with Reference
scenario (Ref) and scenarios A to E. Each box-plot represents the 25th, 50th and 75th
percentiles of the distribution from 40 simulations (whiskers extend to 1.5 times the
inter-quartile range).
Fig. 3. Impact of various prophylactic treatment outcomes to individuals living or
working in a ward exposed to a risk of at least 1/100,000 inhabitants with Reference
scenario (Ref): outbreak size when treatment is administered 2, 4 or 8 days after the
ﬁrst 5, 10 or 15 cases occurred. Each box-plot represents the 25th, 50th and 75th
percentiles of the distribution of the total number of cases from 40 simulations
(whiskers extend to 1.5 times the inter-quartile range).
Fig. 4. Average effectiveness of various prophylactic treatment outcomes at preventing
disease for infected individuals. We conservatively set t1=0 in Eq. (A3) in the Appendix
in order to obtain a lower bound on the effectiveness. Values of t2 and t3 are provided in
the Methods.
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incubation period distribution meaning that, with any further delays,
interventions might miss the bulk of individuals yet to present with
symptoms. However, intervening after 15 cases means that there are
fewer cases still to become symptomatic and therefore subsequent
delays beyond this will have less effect on the ﬁnal outbreak size
(though the increased delays overall will obviously have resulted in
many more cases). These results highlight the importance of a
combination of early estimation of the geographic targeting of
prophylactic treatment with its rapid distribution; delays with either
are likely to have a detrimental impact on the lives saved overall.
Using Eq. (A3) in the Appendix we note that the average treatment
effectiveness (i.e. the efﬁcacy of treatment when combined with the
timing of antibiotic adherence and/or vaccination immunity) for those
infected individuals who received treatment before displaying
symptoms was:
• No treatment: 0%.
• Vaccination: 7%.
• Imperfect antibiotic adherence: 86%.
• Vaccination+imperfect antibiotic adherence: 89%.
• Full antibiotic adherence: 100%.
Thesevalues are constant across all delays, observednumber of cases
and scenarios outlined in this paper. Furthermore, these values remain
stable for inhaleddoses of up to approximately 10,000 spores (see Fig. 4)
andwould therefore apply tomuch larger releases than consideredhere
(where those infected inhaled approximately 10 spores). For very large
doses (N10,000 inhaled spores) the effectiveness of full/imperfect
antibiotic adherence in preventing disease decreases (Fig. 4) since it is
increasingly likely that spores will remain in the lungs even after
60 days of taking antibiotics. Fig. 4 also shows the effectiveness of the
vaccination alone strategy similarly decreasing with increasing dose; a
result of the increasing probability of spore germination prior to gaining
immunity. Only the ‘Vaccination+imperfect antibiotic adherence’
outcome remains somewhat effective at very high doses because
immunity is achieved whilst taking antibiotics for a proportion of
individuals. This effect is considered further in the discussion.Discussion
Hupert et al. (2009) recently summarised the inputs and outputs
of eight US based anthrax modelling studies and highlighted the
importance of comparing and contrasting the results of complemen-
tary work-streams in order to gain a consensus regarding optimal
mitigation strategies. Fittingly, we have built on earlier research by
combining our spatial back-calculation methodology results (Legrand
et al., 2009) with various post-exposure prophylactic treatment
strategies proposed by others (Brookmeyer et al., 2004; Wein and
Craft, 2005). Our results conﬁrm that rapid identiﬁcation of a covert
anthrax release after the smallest number possible of early cases; an
immediate statistical assessment of its geographic extent based on
their case histories; and a rapidly targeted antibiotic prophylaxis
strategy for those deemed exposed is critical if casualties are to be
minimised.
In this study we examined potentially more realistic (i.e. poorer)
adherence with antibiotics than considered previously and found that
such imperfect adherence might result in approximately 15% extra
cases with early implementation of treatment. The absolute differ-
ences in outbreak size here were small because of the low inhaled
doses (and thus the small outbreak sizes) that result from the
scenarios considered. However, for larger releases the impact of
adherence is likely to be signiﬁcant especially when combined with
rapid interventions, where large numbers of lives could potentially be
saved. Indeed, even at high exposure levels (~10,000 spores) the
previously assumed 100% effectiveness of antibiotics falls to 86%when
assuming the adherence levels observed during the 2001 anthrax
attacks. For individuals inhaling particularly large doses (N10,000
spores), antibiotics might be required for 4 months or longer
(Brookmeyer et al., 2003); in such scenarios vaccination could be
used to shorten the antibiotic course (Brookmeyer et al., 2004). Thus,
although full antibiotic adherence would be optimal for the majority
of cases in many release scenarios, additional vaccination might have
to be considered for individuals experiencing very high exposure
levels, as well as for mitigating against imperfect antibiotic adherence
(and any strain resistance to antibiotics).
Although we can generalise our results somewhat, modelling
larger ‘worst-case’ anthrax releases would require slightly different
assumptions to those considered in this study. For example, due to
the small outbreak sizes here we assumed that cases would receive
193J.R. Egan et al. / Epidemics 2 (2010) 189–194antibiotics at approximately the same time but distributing anti-
biotics during much larger outbreaks is likely to take a number of
additional days (Brookmeyer et al., 2004; Wein and Craft, 2005;
Baccam and Boechler, 2007; Zaric et al., 2008; Wilkening, 2008;
Hupert et al., 2009), potentially resulting in many more cases. On
the other hand, with larger outbreaks and therefore a larger number
of early cases, it is important to consider that outbreak detection
may occur sooner and that adherence rates could increase due to a
greater perceived risk of infection (Braithwaite et al., 2006). In
reality, and perhaps most importantly, although a higher number of
cases is likely to provide improved estimates of the location and
spatial extent of a deliberate release, there will be signiﬁcant public
health challenges in rapidly and reliably collecting the requiredepidemiological data, especially from individuals (or their relatives/
friends) that are already seriously ill.Acknowledgments
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With the time of exposure to anthrax spores at t=0 we denote a strategy without interventions as S0 and a strategy with interventions,
starting at time t1, as S1. Under S0, we denote the number of cases developing symptoms before t1 as C1 and the number of cases developing
symptoms after t1 as C2. The total number of cases, C, is then given by:
C = C1 + C2:
Under S1 we have:
C = C1 + C2 1−dð Þ
where d is the effectiveness of treatment given by:
d = 1− P developing symptoms with S1 jno symptoms before t1ð Þ
P developing symptoms with S0 jno symptoms before t1ð Þ
:
Derivation of the effectiveness
The probability, p, of infection given an inhaled dose, D, (also known as the dose–response function or attack rate) of anthrax in humans can
be described by the following equation:




where λ=1⁎10−4 days−1 and θ=0.109 days−1 are the spore germination and clearance rates, respectively, from the lung (Brookmeyer et al.,
2004). We note that:
P developing symptoms before t1ð Þ = 1− exp −D
λ
λ + θ
1−e− λ + θð Þt1
  
⇒P no symptoms before t1ð Þ = exp −D
λ
λ + θ
1−e− λ + θð Þt1
  
:
Conditioning on the attack rate we ﬁnd that:
pcondition = P developing symptoms with S0 jno symptoms before t1ð Þ =
P developing symptoms with S0∩ no symptoms before t1ð Þ
P no symptoms before t1ð Þ
=
P developing symptoms with S0 after t1ð Þ
P no symptoms before t1ð Þ
=
p−P developing symptoms before t1ð Þ
P no symptoms before t1ð Þ
=
1− exp −D λ
λ + θ
 
− 1− exp −D λ
λ + θ
1−e− λ + θð Þt1
   
exp −D λ
λ + θ
1−e− λ + θð Þt1
   = 1− exp −D λλ + θ e




The modiﬁed attack rate, c, for an individual who starts and stops taking antibiotics at t1 days and t2 days, respectively, and then acquires
immunity (via vaccination) at t3 days is given by:
c = P developing symptoms with S1ð Þ = 1− exp −D
λ
λ + θ
1−e− λ + θð Þt1 + e− λ + θð Þt2−e− λ + θð Þt3
  
:
194 J.R. Egan et al. / Epidemics 2 (2010) 189–194Here we assume that antibiotic distribution and vaccination occur at the same time. Note that for a strategy of vaccination alone, t2= t1, for a
strategy of antibiotics alone, t3→∞, and we set t3= t2 if immunity develops before an individual stops taking antibiotics (Brookmeyer et al.,
2004). As before it holds that:
P developing symptoms before t1ð Þ = 1− exp −D
λ
λ + θ
1−e− λ + θð Þt1
  
⇒P no symptoms before t1ð Þ = exp −D
λ
λ + θ
1−e− λ + θð Þt1
  
:
Conditioning on the modiﬁed attack rate we ﬁnd that:
ccondition = P developing symptoms with S1 jno symptoms before t1ð Þ =
P developing symptoms with S1∩ no symptoms before t1ð Þ
P no symptoms before t1ð Þ
=
P developing symptoms with S1 after t1ð Þ
P no symptoms before t1ð Þ
=
c−P developing symptoms before t1ð Þ
P no symptoms before t1ð Þ
=
1− exp −D λ
λ + θ
1−e− λ + θð Þt1 + e− λ + θð Þt2−e− λ + θð Þt3
  
− 1− exp −D λ
λ + θ
1−e− λ + θð Þt1
   
exp −D λ
λ + θ
1−e− λ + θð Þt1
  
= 1− exp −D λ
λ + θ




Combining Eqs. (A1) and (A2) we ﬁnd that the effectiveness of treatment is then given by:
d = 1− ccondition
pcondition
= 1−
1− exp −D λ
λ + θ
e− λ + θð Þt2−e− λ + θð Þt3
  
1− exp −D λ
λ + θ
e− λ + θð Þt1
  : ðA3Þ
We applied Eq. (A3) to those infected individuals who had been identiﬁed for treatment via the spatial back-calculation methodology
(Legrand et al., 2009) and who were yet to present with symptoms at the time of treatment administration. Note that an equivalent equation for
exposed (rather than infected) individuals is given by:
e = 1−ccondition ðA4ÞReferences
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